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Bonus Payments, Hierarchy Levels and Tenure:                                     
Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
Executives are rewarded according to both long-term and short-term performance. Following 
the traditional view on executive compensation, promotion-based incentive schemes are used 
to honor long-term success, whereas bonus-based incentive schemes typically fix annual 
payments to focus on short-term goals (Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988). In the last two 
decades, applied contract theory has emphasized that bonus payments can also be seen as part 
of a long-term wage policy of a firm. In particular, two approaches have contributed to this 
view. First, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) pointed out that the optimal incentive mix consists of 
explicit pay-for-performance (i.e., bonuses) and implicit career incentives.
1 In the beginning 
of an employee’s career, high ability uncertainty provides strong career concerns so that the 
firm can skip high powered explicit incentives. However, the more ability uncertainty 
diminishes the less effective will be career concerns for employee motivation and the firm 
must more strongly rely on bonus payments as explicit incentives. Hence, according to 
Gibbons and Murphy (1992), bonuses and career incentives are substitutes, implying a 
positive relation between tenure and bonus payments of employees. 
Second, bonus payments and an executive’s internal career may also be complements: In the 
case of limited liability, linking job promotion to individual performance generates strong 
incentives for executives at lower levels since climbing the ladder is associated with 
significant rents when attaining higher levels of the hierarchy. As rents at higher tiers of a 
corporate hierarchy can only be used for incentive purposes when being combined with job 
promotion, bonuses and internal careers are complements within the optimal wage policy of a 
firm (Kräkel and Schöttner 2009, 2010). According to this view, bonus payments are 
positively related to hierarchy levels in the sense that bonuses increase upwards a corporate 
hierarchy. 
In this paper, by using data from the German chemical industry we explore whether real 
executive compensation is in line with these two approaches. The two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive as bonuses at high hierarchy levels may serve both purposes – being a 
                                                            
1 See Fama (1980) and Holmström (1982, 1999) on implicit incentives via career concerns.   3
substitute for missing implicit career incentives and transferring rents to executives. Hence, 
there are four possible outcomes: (1) only the substitutes approach turns out to be valid, (2) 
only the complements approach is valid, (3) both approaches are supported by the data, or (4) 
neither approach proves relevant in practice. The data provide detailed information of more 
than 5,000 executives. In particular, we know all components of each executive’s 
compensation, his or her
2 hierarchy level, tenure, occupational skills and other individual 
characteristics. We use two proxies for the intensity of bonus pay: first, the fact whether an 
executive has a bonus contract or not, and second, the executive’s individual bonus income 
relative to his total compensation. Whereas the first indicates the contractual pay for 
performance relevance, the second measures the actual pay for (individual, group and/or firm) 
performance. The results indicate that bonus contracts and payments are mostly prevalent 
among executives with large tenure at higher tiers of the corporate hierarchy and rather for 
management jobs than for jobs in research and development. Hence, the data offer empirical 
support for both the substitutes approach and the complements approach. 
Concerning the complements approach, note that the use of bonuses is only one of several 
alternatives to transfer rents to executives. For example, promotion can be directly 
accompanied by an increase of the executive’s base wage. Moreover, there are non-monetary 
rewards like flexible working time and discretion (e.g., Lazear 1995, pp. 57-62, 85, 1998, 
chapter 14) as well as perks like company cars and nice offices (e.g., Marino and Zábojnik 
2008a, b), which are particularly important for managers. Since we only focus on bonuses in 
our paper, this may lead to an underestimation of rent transfer. Therefore, including additional 
sources of rent transfer would even strengthen our empirical findings. 
To the best of our knowledge the substitutes approach has not been empirically compared 
with the complements approach so far. Nevertheless, our paper is related to part of the 
compensation literature. There is a rich literature on executive pay with a special focus on the 
compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs) (e.g., Murphy 1999 for an overview). 
Hereby, many contributions focus on stock options and not on bonus payments. As an 
exception, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) empirically tested their substitutes approach by using 
publicly available data on salaries, bonuses and other compensation ingredients of 3,000 
CEOs from the U.S. The results are in line with their theoretical model of explicit and implicit 
                                                            
2 We use the male form for managers and the female form for the employer in the remainder of this contribution 
for simplicity.   4
incentives being substitutes by showing that pay for performance sensibilities are higher for 
CEOs nearing retirement. 
The career-concerns part of the substitutes approach has also been experimentally tested in the 
laboratory. For their experiments, Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2006) as well as Koch, Morgenstern 
and Raab (2009) used a simplified two-period version of the well-known career-concerns 
model by Holmström (1982, 1999). The two experimental papers yield mixed results on the 
validity of career concerns for real decision makers. 
Another strand of the literature explores the wage policy of single firms. For instance, Baker, 
Gibbs and Holmström (1994a, 1994b) as well as Treble et al. (2001) use personnel records 
and examine the white collar workforces of single financial sector firms. They concentrate on 
fix wages and abstain from dealing with bonuses, though. In a recent case study, Ockenfels, 
Sliwka and Werner (2010) examine a large firm with subsidiaries in Germany and the U.S. 
and focus on perceived reference points of bonus payments. The authors explore 
consequences (e.g., job satisfaction, supervisor performance) of bonuses rather than 
determinants. 
Ortin-Angel and Salas-Fumas (1998) examine determinants of bonus incidence and bonus 
levels based on individual cross section data from Spain in 1990. They refer to Gibbs (1995) 
who – similar to the model of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) – predicts that explicit bonus 
payments and implicit career incentives are substitutes in the optimal compensation package 
for managers. Ortin-Angel and Salas-Fumas point out that their results support the substitutes 
model of Gibbs (1995). Their empirical study differs from ours in several respects. First, they 
do not explore the bonus fraction relative to total compensation. Second, they do not analyze 
the bonus policy of single firms. As the two authors consider different sectors of the Spanish 
economy, they investigate sectoral patterns of managerial compensation, whereas our study 
concentrates on one industry with more homogeneous firms. Third, they do not investigate the 
complements approach. 
Note that there also exist other compensation theories that lead to similar predictions as the 
substitutes and the complements approaches – a positive relationship between hierarchy level 
and tenure on the one hand and managerial compensation on the other hand. However, these 
theories deal with the increase of base salaries and not with pay for performance in form of 
bonuses. Therefore, our bonus data cannot be used to investigate the relevance of these 
theories. Two of the most prominent approaches dealing with base salary and hierarchy level   5
or tenure, respectively, are introduced by Rosen (1982, 1986). In Rosen (1982), the effort of a 
certain manager influences the values of marginal product of all subordinate managers. 
Consequently, the higher a manager is located in the corporate hierarchy the higher should be 
his base salary. Rosen (1986) considers a dynamic tournament model. In order to motivate 
risk-averse employees in a corporate hierarchy, wage differentials between hierarchy levels 
should be positive and increasing along the promotion ladder. In particular, the spread 
between CEO compensation and the base salary of the vice president of the corporation 
should be very large to induce incentives for all employees that have a positive probability to 
become CEO once in their career.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the substitutes 
approach and the complements approach in more details, and suggests three hypotheses. The 
data are introduced in Section 3. The main empirical findings are derived in Section 4. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Intertemporal Incentives and Bonus Payments - Theoretical Considerations and 
Hypotheses 
Bonuses are typically used for creating short-term incentives. If, for example, the performance 
of a certain department exceeds a given annual threshold, the respective department manager 
will receive a prespecified bonus for this year. However, bonus payments can also play an 
important role in the long run. In the following subsections, we present two alternatives for 
creating incentives that work against moral hazard of employees. We argue that bonuses can 
either substitute or complement implicit career incentives. In the substitute case, bonus 
payments and tenure should be positively related. In the complement case, there should be a 
positive relation between bonus payments and hierarchy level (i.e., bonus contracts should be 
particularly observed on high levels of a corporate hierarchy).  
 
Bonuses as Career Substitutes 
The first approach has been analyzed by Gibbons and Murphy (1992). It is based on the 
seminal papers by Fama (1980) and Holmström (1982, 1999), addressing the topic of career 
concerns: Fama and Holmström assume that labor market competition for talented employees 
leads to a strictly positive relation between an employee’s expected talent and his market   6
value. The higher the expected talent is, the higher will be the reservation value of the 
employee and, therefore, the higher the actual payment by his current employer. When an 
employee starts working and enters a low level of a corporate hierarchy there is still high 
uncertainty about his true productivity or talent. This uncertainty is symmetric between 
employee and employer so that both learn from the employee’s success and failure on the job. 
Technically, the employee’s productivity can be described by a random variable that follows a 
given prior distribution, based on previous experiences and statistical information. Due to 
Bayesian updating, every success of the employee shifts probability mass from the left of the 
distribution to the right, thus increasing the employee’s posterior expected productivity and 
thereby his market value. Conversely, every failure leads to a probability shift from the right 
to the left and, therefore, decreases the employee’s posterior expected productivity. In this 
early stage of an employee’s career with high talent uncertainly, individuals have very strong 
career incentives since success and failure have a high impact on the posterior talent 
distribution, determining the individuals’ reservation values. Consequently, they choose high 
effort levels. The more talent uncertainty diminishes as tenure increases, the smaller will be 
an employee’s career incentives. From a technical perspective, low talent uncertainty means 
that the variance of the employee’s unknown productivity shrinks or, in other words, the 
precision of observed performance as a signal of underlying productivity increases. Now, 
additional observations on success and failure only have less influence on the redistribution of 
posterior probability mass. As a consequence, if tenure rises the employee will reduce effort 
in order to save effort costs. 
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) combine the career-concerns model with bonuses to analyze a 
firm’s optimal mix of explicit and implicit incentives. They assume that an employee’s output 
to the firm in period t, yt, is linear in effort chosen by the employee in that period, et, and the 
employee’s unknown talent, η: 
yt = η + et + εt. 
Unknown talent η is modeled as a random variable that follows a certain distribution with 
variance Var[η]. According to the assumption of symmetric talent uncertainty, this 
distribution is common knowledge for the employer, the employee and the remaining labor 
market. εt is a random noise variable for period t (e.g., denoting measurement error) with 
noise being stochastically independent across periods. Output is observable and verifiable by 
the firm, whereas talent, effort and noise are unobservable. Hence, we have a moral hazard   7
problem. The firm is assumed to be risk neutral, but the employee is risk averse. Gibbons and 
Murphy assume that long-term or multi-period contracts are not feasible. 
At the beginning of an employee’s career, Var[η] is rather large. On the one hand, following 
the career-concerns approach, this high talent uncertainty leads to strong implicit career 
incentives. On the other hand, explicit incentives via a bonus contract based on observed 
output are very costly for the firm: Since Var[η] is large, output is mainly determined by the 
exogenous random variable η. In order to motivate the employee in such situations, the firm 
must offer very high bonuses in case of high outputs. Moreover, since the employee is risk 
averse a large value of Var[η] will be associated with a large risk premium, if the employee is 
incentivized via bonuses. This risk premium is completely paid by the firm given that the 
employee is not protected by limited liability. For these reasons, the firm will use implicit 
career incentives but does not offer explicit bonus payments if the employee is at the 
beginning of his career. As employee tenure increases, talent uncertainty diminishes. The 
more the uncertainly is reduced (i.e., the smaller Var[η]), the less effective will be implicit 
career incentives, which has been pointed out above. In this situation, the firm will use bonus 
schemes as a substitute for missing career incentives. If an employee’s tenure is quite high, 
there is only marginal talent uncertainty so that implicit career incentives are completely 
replaced by explicit bonus schemes. Low talent uncertainty makes these bonuses very 
effective and rather cheap for the firm. Altogether, the optimal incentive mix leads to a strong 
positive relationship between tenure and bonuses, yielding our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The relevance of bonus payments increases in tenure. 
 
This substitutes approach is based on career concerns due to talent uncertainty. If this 
approach is highly relevant, then career incentives (instead of bonuses) should be prevalent 
for jobs, in which talent uncertainty matters, whereas bonus contracts should be attached to 
those jobs with routine and administrative dominated tasks. Thus, we should observe less 
relevance of bonus payments at research and development jobs. Here, high talent uncertainty 
should favor implicit career incentives instead of explicit pay for performance in form of 
bonuses. Note that career incentives for industrial researchers can take two different forms. 
On the one hand, researchers may be interested to climb up the hierarchy by becoming head 
of the research department or by switching to the management track. On the other hand, 
researchers may primarily be interested to stay in the research area. For these individuals,   8
career incentives can be generated by promising higher research budgets or promotion along a 
special research track, the so-called dual ladder (see already Smith and Szabo (1977) on the 
dual ladder at Union Carbide in the 1970s). Talent uncertainty plays a minor role for 
managerial tasks at rather administrative jobs in the areas of controlling, finance, marketing 
and HR. For these jobs, explicit incentives via bonus payments should be more important. 
Hypothesis 2: Bonuses should mainly be paid at management jobs rather than in 
   research and development. 
 
Bonuses as Complements to Internal Careers 
If, contrary to the career-concerns approach, initial talent uncertainty of young employees’ is 
not an issue (e.g., due to formal qualifications that credibly signal true talent in the sense of 
Spence 1973), career incentives may still work when being complemented by bonus payments 
at higher hierarchy levels: Let an employee’s output in period t again be described by the 
linear production function yt = η + et + εt. However, without talent uncertainty the variable η is 
now deterministic and common knowledge. Because of unobservable noise εt the employer 
still faces a moral hazard problem. She can use a bonus contract (bL, bH) to induce incentives 
to her employees. The high bonus bH will be paid to an employee if realized output exceeds a 
certain standard y (i.e., yt > y), whereas the low bonus bL (< bH) is given to the employee 
otherwise (i.e., yt < y). Suppose that employees are protected by limited liability (see, e.g., 
Sappington 1983; Innes 1990; Kim 1997) in the sense that bonuses are not allowed to be 
negative. Moreover, let the employees be risk neutral and be characterized by a convex 
disutility-of-effort function (in monetary terms) c(et) with c(0) = c´(0) = 0. Finally, let the 
employees’ reservation values be normalized to zero. 
We can exemplarily sketch the optimal contract for the employees at the highest hierarchy 
level. In the given setting, an employee maximizes his expected utility 
    prob{yt > y} bH + prob{yt < y} bL – c(et) 
= [1 – prob{εt < y – η – et}] bH + prob{εt < y – η – et} bL – c(et) 
= bL + (bH – bL) [1 – F(y – η – et)] – c(et)   9
with F as the cumulative distribution function of the random variable εt. If the employee’s 
objective function is strictly concave, optimal effort choice is described by the first-order 
condition 
(bH – bL) F´(y – η – et) = c´(et). 
Hence, for a given standard and given bonuses an employee’s optimal effort equates marginal 
expected bonus payments and marginal costs. 
Now we consider the employer’s bonus contract. First, note that the employee’s participation 
constraint can be neglected by the employer when solving for the optimal contract, that is, the 
employee will earn a non-negative rent in the optimum: Since bonuses are non-negative due 
to limited liability and c(0) = 0, by accepting any feasible contract and choosing zero effort an 
employee can ensure himself an expected utility that is at least as large as his zero reservation 
value. Second, the optimal low bonus bL is zero since incentives decrease and expected labor 
costs increase in bL. The optimal high bonus bH maximizes the employer’s expected net 
profits E[yt] – bH [1 – F(y – η – et)] subject to the incentive constraint bH F´(y – η – et)] = 
c´(et) and the limited-liability constraint, which is strictly positive in the optimum (i.e., bH > 
0). In any case, an employee at the highest hierarchy level will earn a strictly positive rent if 
the employer wants to implement positive effort levels. 
When looking at lower hierarchy levels, we have a completely different situation. Employees 
located at lower levels anticipate that they will earn expected bonus payments and, hence, 
positive rents if being promoted to higher levels. This expectation generates strong career 
incentives even if employees’ talents are perfectly known in the beginning. Since expected 
bonuses at the top of the hierarchy complement an employee’s internal career along a certain 
ladder and already imply high efforts on lower hierarchy levels, the firm may optimally 
forego bonus schemes at these levels (see Kräkel and Schöttner 2009, 2010). 
Both models may lead to the same observation that high-tenured employees have successfully 
climbed the ladder and now earn large bonus payments at high hierarchy levels, whereas low-
tenured employees at lower ranks of the hierarchy are only offered few if any bonus contracts. 
However, the substitutes issue focuses on tenure, whereas certain hierarchy levels of a firm 
are necessary for the complements argument. In practice, both arguments may well be 
relevant. Empirically it is possible to disentangle tenure from hierarchy level effects. Aiming 
to check the relevance of the complements argument, we formulate   10
Hypothesis 3: Bonus payments are more relevant at higher levels of the hierarchy. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
Examining the hypotheses, we make use of a new and unique data set of highly qualified 
professionals and executive staff of the German chemical industry. The chemical industry is 
important for the whole German economy and dominated by large firms. Subsectors include 
fine and special chemicals, polmers, pharmaceutical products, petrochemicals, detergents and 
toiltries as well as anorganic chemicals. The association of the chemical industry (Verband 
der Chemischen Industrie – VCI) reports an aggregate revenue of the ten largest firms of the 
sector of over 180 billion € in 2008. These ten firms have employed almost 600,000 
employees worldwide (see Table A in the appendix for detailed numbers of single firms). 
Over 400.000 employees are employed in the German chemical sector. Most of them are not 
employed as executives and covered by collective wage agreements, though. 
In collaboration with the German association of executive staff of the chemical industry 
(Verband angestellter Akademiker und leitender Angestellter der Chemischen Industrie e.V. 
(VAA)) we conduct a salary survey. In March 2009, the survey has been sent to VAA 
members and also to members of a partner association GDCh (Gesellschaft deutscher 
Chemiker e.V.), from which about 33 percent respond. According to VAA and GDCh, our 
sample is representative for the respective employees of the chemical sector. Individuals are 
asked about their current job next to some demographics and their previous occupational 
career. In particular, we have detailed information on all components of their 2008 salary such 
as fix wages, bonuses and other integral parts such as exercised stock options, inventors’ 
gratuities or jubilee payments. We have valid information for 5,586 employees.  
In this contribution, we concentrate on bonuses. First, we examine, whether employees have 
some kind of bonus contract. Over 90 percent of employees in the sample affirm a 
corresponding question and over 90 percent of this group actually reports a positive bonus for 
the year 2008. Second, the fraction of the bonus on total yearly salary is taken into account. 
The average bonus fraction amounts to 0.16. These two variables act as dependent variables 
in our empirical analysis. Table 1 provides an overview of descriptive statistics for these and 
other variables. The average bonus of those who receive such payments is about € 21,000.   11
In correspondence to our hypotheses stated in section 2 above, the most important 
independent variables are tenure, hierarchy level and functional area. Tenure is measured in 
years. Focusing on special effects on new hires, we also compare three categories of tenure 
((i) less than 5 years, (ii) 5 to 19 years, (iii) at least 20 years). Functional areas are divided 
into nine categories. About 30 percent of the employees work in the field of R&D. One of six 
employees is allocated to a typical management task such as marketing, finance, controlling 
or HR. Respondents are also asked to allocate themselves to one of four management levels 
from 1 to 4. Hereby, level 1 represents the top-management level.
3 Jobs at a certain level are 
likely to differ between firms with respect to firm size. Therefore, it makes sense to control 
for firm size as well. We can distinguish between eight categories with regard to the number 
of firms’ employees. As mentioned above, the chemical sector is dominated by large firms. 
More than three quarter of respondents work in firms with more than 1,000 employees. 
We also control for sex, age, schooling degrees and field of study. We distinguish between 
apprenticeships, university of applied sciences and university graduates with regard to 
schooling, and between chemistry, other natural sciences, technical and business/economics 
degrees with regard to field of study.
4 Additionally, we have information for the corporation 
in which the employees are employed for more than half of observations. We will use this 
information by examining whether our overall results are robust for single large corporations. 
To the best of our knowledge, the data are unique with regard to the combination of sample 
size and the degree of information on salary components. Representative surveys of the whole 
population such as the IAB employment sample or the German Socio Economic Panel do not 
cover detailed information on bonus payments. Besides, it seems to be useful to have a more 






3 Although our data provide pretty good information about jobs of employees by knowing the level of the 
hierarchy and functional areas, we have to state that tasks and responsibility of jobs may even differ within 
groups. A level 1 manager may also have some further career opportunities by being promoted to the CEO. 
4 We exclude the very few observations with other degrees such as law and humanities from the analysis. This 
restriction does not have any effect on our results.   12
4. Results 
As a first illustration Figures 1 to 3 indicate the relevance of bonus payments for certain 
categories of tenure, hierarchy level and functional area. Although bonus contracts are also 
relevant for recently hired employees, the incidence increases with tenure from 0.83 for 
employees with less than 5 years to 0.95 for 20 and more years of tenure. Accordingly, the 
longtime employees face higher fractions of bonuses than the recently hired (0.18 vs 0.13). At 
first glance, differences in hierarchy levels can be seen for the bonus fraction. There is no 
clear interrelation for the incidence of bonus contracts, though. Note, however, that other 
forms of performance related pay such as stock options are relevant particularly for managers 
at levels 1 and 2.  
Level 1 managers with a positive bonus indeed report particularly high payments of € 55,000 
on average. With regard to the functional area the bar graphs hint for particular bonus 
relevance in the typical management areas such as marketing, finance, controlling and HR. In 
contrast, the corresponding values for employees in the R&D area are somewhat lower. 
Therefore, firms seem to distinguish bonus payments with regard to tenure, hierarchy level 
and functional area, although some institutional pressure may work against it. Usually, 
employees’ interest groups such as works councils or the representative committee of 
executive employees try to avoid a substantially unequal treatment of employees. In a next 
step, we examine the impact of tenure, hierarchy level and functional area in more details. 




th percentiles of bonus fraction. Intra-group 
differences are quite large.   13
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 




Bonus contract [1=yes] 
Bonus [€] 



















0 to 4 years of tenure 
5 to 19 years of tenure 






























Research and development 
Technology 
Applications engineering 
Sales, marketing, logistics, sourcing 


























Less than 100 employees 
101 to 300 employees 
301 to 1,000 employees 
1,001 to 2,000 employees 
2,001 to 5,000 employees 
5,001 to 10,000employees 
10,001 to 30,000 employees 

































Field of study 
Chemistry 














Sex [1=female]  5,586  0.087   
Age 5,586  47.56  7.579   14





Notes: Figures show shares respectively means (dots) as well as percentiles (10th, 25th, 75th, 
90th). 
   15













Notes: Figures show shares respectively means (dots) as well as percentiles (10th, 25th, 75th, 
90th).   17
Table 2 presents the results of our multivariate analysis. We run two regressions with our two 
bonus variables as dependent variables. Since the incidence of a bonus contract is a binary 
variable, we apply a binary probit approach here. An ordinary least square estimation is used 
for the regression on the fraction of the bonuses. In order to better interpret the coefficients, 
we stick to simple fractions. A transformation of the fraction x by ln(x/(1-x)) leads to the 
same results.  
The results support our three hypotheses. Indeed, bonus payments are more relevant for 
employees with longer periods of tenure, for individuals with jobs at higher hierarchy levels, 
and for those with management rather than R&D tasks. The results do not depend on the 
proxy for bonus relevance, but are robust for the incidence of bonus contracts and the fraction 
of bonus payments on total salary. All results are highly statistically significant. 
In order to report the economic relevance, marginal effects for binary probit estimates can be 
calculated for the mean of other variables. Since bonus contracts are prevalent for most 
employees in the sector, marginal effects for bonus contracts are not too big. Additional ten 
years of tenure lead to an increase in the incidence of a bonus contract of 1.4 percentage 
points. Level 1 managers face a higher incidence in the amount of 3.4 percentage points than 
level 3 employees, and employees in management areas have a 4 percentage points higher 
incidence than R&D workers.
5 Differences with respect to the fraction of the bonus on total 
salary are more pronounced for level and job area than for tenure. The bonus fraction of level 
1 managers is seven percentage points higher than at level 3. The fraction of employees at 
sales exceeds that of R&D workers in the amount of three percentage points.
 6 
                                                            
5 The detailed results with respect to marginal effects are provided by the authors on request. 
6 The results are also robust with respect to the absolute amount of bonus payments as a possible third indicator 
of bonus relevance. Differences concerning the amount of bonuses are somewhat pronounced. Interpreting the 
data as causal effects, each additional year of tenure increases the bonus in the amount of 1.4 percent. Executives 
at level 1 earn a bonus more than twice as high than the employees at level 3. Employees with management task 
receive considerably higher bonuses (sales, marketing, logistics: 33 percent, finance, controlling, hr: 20 percent) 
than R&D workers.   18
 
 
Table 2: Regressions on bonus relevance  
 
 Bonus  contract 
(1=yes) 
- Binary probit - 
Bonus fraction 
 
- OLS - 
Tenure [years] 
Tenure squared 
 0.042*** (0.010) 
-0.0009*** (0.0003) 
 0.0030*** (0.0005) 
-0.00006*** (0.00001) 
Level (base: level 3) 




 0.454*** (0.164) 
 0.174**   (0.080) 
-0.300*** (0.064) 
 
 0.080*** (0.012) 
 0.031**   (0.004) 
-0.012*** (0.002) 




Sales, marketing, logistics, sourcing 





 0.050       (0.075) 
 0.205*     (0.119) 
 0.444*** (0.132) 
 0.577*** (0.119) 
 0.644*** (0.198) 
 0.354*** (0.137) 
 0.262       (0.237) 
 0.085       (0.092) 
 
 0.001       (0.003) 
 0.008** (0.004) 
 0.007       (0.005) 
 0.028*** (0.004) 
 0.016*** (0.005) 
 0.001       (0.004) 
 0.011     (0.007) 
 0.006*     (0.004) 
Firm size (base: 1,001 to 2,000) 
Less than 100 employees 
101 to 300 employees 
301 to 1,000 employees 
2,001 to 5,000 employees 
5,001 to 10,000employees 
10,001 to 30,000 employees 





 0.080      (0.106) 
 0.418*** (0.122) 
 0.440*** (0.105) 





-0.009**   (0.005) 
 0.007       (0.004) 
 0.019*** (0.004) 
 0.063*** (0.004) 
Schooling (base: university degree) 
University of applied sciences degree 
Apprenticeship degree 
 
 0.028       (0.104) 




Field of study (base: chemistry) 




-0.084       (0.076) 
 0.036       (0.082) 
-0.150       (0.181) 
 
 0.004       (0.003) 
 0.012*** (0.003) 
-0.001       (0.006) 
Sex [1=female]  -0.234*** (0.086)  -0,0064*     (0.004) 
Age  -0.001       (0.005)  0.0002       (0.0002) 
Intercept   1.156*** (0.229)   0.103***  (0.010) 
Number of observations  5,586  4,807 
R
2  0.184 0.216 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors. Significant result at the 10%, 5% and 
1% level are indicated with *, ** and *** respectively.   19
To summarize, since tenure and job dummies as well as hierarchy levels are significantly 
associated to bonus relevance, the results are in line with our hypothetical considerations of 
section 2. In this sense, we can ascribe both the substitute and the complement argument 
empirical relevance. Although we cannot check strict causal effects, there are at least no 
empirical hints opposed to our considerations. 
Our results are robust with respect to a number of different specifications. The hierarchy 
levels 1 to 4 might have a different meaning across firm size categories. Estimations for single 
categories generally lead to the same results, though. The tenure effects are somewhat more 
pronounced in large firms, whereas differences across functional areas are a little bit more 
relevant in smaller firms. Neither estimations for single hierarchy levels nor implementing 
interaction terms of hierarchy levels and tenure lead to additional than the general results. 
It is worth mentioning that the two regressions of Table 2 are connected to each other. As 
stated above, most individuals have explicit bonus contracts and most of these indeed get a 
positive bonus. One may argue at first glance that some kind of double hurdle model might be 
relevant. However, there are also some managers, who state a positive bonus without having 
an explicit bonus contract. Nevertheless, managers receiving a bonus payment are not 
necessarily a random selection of all managers. In order to take into account a possible 
selection bias, a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1976) can be used, where the bonus 
fraction and the probability to get such a payment are estimated in one common approach (see 
Table B in the appendix). The results of the probit (selection) model coincide with the 
outcomes of the binary probit model of Table 2. The results with regard to determinants of the 
bonus fraction do not differ, either. 
Firms may differ with respect to their bonus policy. As mentioned above, we can assign 
employees to certain firms in the majority of cases. It is therefore possible to analyze the 
bonus policy of single firms. We have more than 100 observations for four large corporations. 
We call these corporations ChemCorp A, B, C and D, respectively. In these four firms, almost 
all employees under considerations have bonus contracts. There are hardly any observations 
for level 1 employees so that we exclude the few observations and concentrate on the bonus 
fraction. Re-estimating the regression of Table 2 for employees of these four firms only lead 
to the same qualitative results compared to the general perspective of the chemical sector (see 
Table C in the appendix). However, the absolute level and relative importance of bonus 
payments differ considerably across firms. Employees of ChemCorp A receive much higher   20
bonuses than employees of the other firms. We checked that bonus levels and fractions are 
positively correlated with some measures of firm performance such as growth of revenue. 
Firmwise estimations show that bonus payments are determined by tenure and level in most 
cases (see Table D in the appendix). Functional areas as supposed above are relevant only in 
two (A and D) of these firms, though. 
In order to examine a particular relevance for recently hired employees, we re-estimate the 
specifications of Tables 2 described above with three categories of tenure instead of a metric 
tenure variable (see Table 3). Indeed, the results concerning tenure are mainly driven by 
employees with less than five years of tenure. This is true for the employees under 
consideration in general and also for three of the four large corporations of the chemical 
sector A, B and C. There are no meaningful differences between employees with 5 to 19 years 
of tenure and workers with at least 20 years at their firm. In contrast, bonuses are less relevant 
for recently hired employees with tenure up to 4 years, independent of the bonus dimension. 
 
Table 3: Regression on bonus relevance – results for tenure categories                               
(one regression per row) 
   Tenure (base: 5 to 19 years) 
 
Dependent variable  0 to 4 years of 
tenure 









 0.004       (0.003) 
 0.070**   (0.028) 




-0.207**   (0.103) 
-0.026*     (0.015) 
 0.007      (0.062) 




-0.627*     (0.353) 
-0.045*   (0.025) 
 0.122       (0.083) 





-0.048**   (0.020) 
0.127        (0.157) 




-0.097       (0.159) 
-0.007       (0.014) 
-0.154       (0.108) 
-0.009       (0.009) 
Notes: Same specification as Table 2 and 3 (tenure dummies instead of tenure in years). The table 
reports coefficients and robust standard errors. Significant result at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are 
indicated with *, ** and *** respectively.  
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5. Conclusion  
We provide evidence for individual and job based characteristics that affect bonus payments 
for executives in Germany. Due to lack of data this issue has been addressed only 
insufficiently before. Our data set has the advantage that we are able to run firmwise 
regressions, which allow to examine possible differences in the bonus policies of single firms. 
Using unique data from executive compensation in the German chemical industry we can 
show that bonus payments are in line with two different purposes within the long term wage 
policy of firms. First, bonuses substitute implicit career incentives when the ability of a 
manager is revealed over time. Second, bonuses also complement internal careers by 
generating strong job-promotion incentives via substantial employee rents at higher hierarchy 
levels. Our data contain information on tenure and hierarchy levels of executives next to 
detailed information on individual compensation so that the two effects can be disentangled.  
Some limitations of our study occur due to data restrictions. Similar to Ortin-Angel and Salas-
Fumas (1998), we only have a cross-section data set and cannot examine changes over a 
specific period of time. The possible problem of unobserved heterogeneity could be 
diminished with appropriate panel data. However, if the internal wage structures of the firms 
are rather stable over time, our cross-section analysis will give a reliable picture of the firms’ 
bonus policies. For example, Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994a, 1994b) analyzed the wage 
policy of a single corporation over a period of 20 years and pointed out that both the 
organizational structure and the wage structure of the corporation do not significantly change 
during their observation period. 
Both the substitutes approach and the complements approach are based on the assumption that 
there is sufficient internal mobility upwards the firms’ hierarchies. Our cross-section data do 
not offer information on individual job promotion and executives’ real opportunities of 
climbing up the corporate hierarchy.  In addition, there may be certain positions that are 
regularly filled by hiring executives from outside. However, we know from discussions with 
VAA members and  representatives that there is substantial internal promotion in the sector. 
Analyzing the relation between bonus relevance and tenure, we have to state that the actual 
amount of the bonus usually depends on the performance of the individual (and also the 
performance of his division and the whole firm). If individual performance depends on tenure,   22
it is even more difficult to identify causal effects. However, the incidence of a bonus contract 
variable is not hit by this problem and we show significant relevance for this variable, too.  
Future work with repeated corresponding surveys may, for instance, contribute to the issues, 
to what extent bonuses and other wage components are affected by the recent economic crisis 
and whether this global crisis has long term effects in general or for certain cohorts of 
employees in particular. 
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Table A: Largest firms of the German chemical sector (ranked by 2008 revenue) 
 




BASF S.E.   
Bayer AG   
Evonik Industries AG  
Henkel KGaA   
Linde AG   
Fresenius S.E.   
Boehringer Ingelheim GmbH  
Merck KGaA   
Lanxess AG   
Beiersdorf AG   
K+S AG   
Wacker Chemie AG  
B. Braun Melsungen AG 
Cognis GmbH   
Ratiopharm GmbH   
Stada Arzneimittel AG  
SGL Carbon S.E.  
Westfalen AG   
Fuchs Petrolub AG  









































Subsidiaries of foreign firms    
Sandoz International GmbH 
Dow Gruppe Deutschland 
Procter & Gamble Deutschland GmbH 
Basell Polyolefine GmbH   
Roche Deutschland Holding GmbH  
Sanofi-Aventis Deutschland GmbH   
Novartis Deutschland GmbH   
Unilever Deutschland GmbH   
Celanese GmbH    





















Source: VCI 2009 (http://www.vci.de/default~cmd~shd~docnr~94490~lastDokNr~-1.htm) 
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Table B: Regressions on bonus relevance (Heckman selection model) 
 







 0.072*** (0.009) 
-0.002*** (0.0003) 
 0.0040*** (0.0008) 
-0.00008*** (0.00002) 
Level (base: level 3) 




 0.288**   (0.142) 
 0.093       (0.070) 
-0.256*** (0.054) 
 
 0.085*** (0.008) 
 0.033*** (0.003) 
-0.015*** (0.003) 




Sales, marketing, logistics, sourcing 





 0.147**   (0.067) 
 0.289*** (0.101) 
 0.446*** (0.110) 
 0.494*** (0.908) 
 0.500*** (0.143) 
 0.268**   (0.112) 
 0.266       (0.178) 
 0.084       (0.078) 
 
 0.003       (0.004) 
 0.013*** (0.005) 
 0.012**   (0.006) 
 0.033*** (0.005) 
 0.021*** (0.006) 
 0.004       (0.005) 
 0.014*     (0.008) 
 0.006       (0.004) 
Firm size (base: 1,001 to 2,000) 
Less than 100 employees 
101 to 300 employees 
301 to 1,000 employees 
2,001 to 5,000 employees 
5,001 to 10,000employees 
10,001 to 30,000 employees 





 0.256*** (0.938) 
 0.423*** (0.100) 
 0.429*** (0.087) 





-0.006       (0.005) 
-0.004       (0.005) 
 0.024*** (0.005) 
 0.067*** (0.005) 
Schooling (base: university degree) 
University of applied sciences degree 
Apprenticeship degree 
 
-0.069       (0.088) 




Field of study (base: chemistry) 




-0.037      (0.640) 
 0.041      (0.068) 
 0.307      (0.149) 
 
 0.003       (0.003) 
 0.012*** (0.003) 
-0.001       (0.006) 
Sex [1=female]  -0.095      (0.076)  ---
a 
Age  -0.004      (0.004)  ---
a 
Intercept   0.652*** (0.186)   0.092*** (0.013) 
Number of observations  5,586  4,807 
λ
  0.036    (0.026) 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and standard errors. Significant result at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level are indicated with *, ** and *** respectively. 
a sex and age have been skipped due to the 
necessity of having more independent variables in the selection model.   26
 
 
Table C: Regressions on bonus relevance in four large corporations 
 
 Bonus  fraction 
 
- OLS - 
Tenure [years] 
Tenure squared 
0.0025**    (0.0012) 
-0.00005*  (0.00003) 






 0.059*** (0.012) 
-0.019*** (0.004) 




Sales, marketing, logistics, sourcing 





-0.002       (0.006) 
 0.013       (0.008) 
 0.002       (0.007) 
 0.026*** (0.009) 
 0.018**   (0.008) 
 0.002       (0.008) 
 0.011       (0.009) 
 0.008       (0.008) 
Schooling (base: university degree) 
University of applied sciences degree 
Apprenticeship degree 
 
-0.017**   (0.007) 
-0.014       (0.015) 
Field of study (base: chemistry) 




 0.0007     (0.007) 
 0.004       (0.005) 
-0.008       (0.012) 
Sex [1=female]  -0,005       (0.008) 
Age  0.0001       (0.0006) 








Intercept   0.217***  (0.022) 
Number of observations  743 
R
2  0.456 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors. Significant result at the 10%, 5% and 




Table D: Bonus relevance in four large corporations of the chemical industry 
 
  ChemCorp A  ChemCorp B  ChemCorp C  ChemCorp D 
  Bonus fraction  Bonus fraction  Bonus fraction  Bonus fraction 
Tenure [years] 
Tenure squered 
 0.0035*    (0.0019) 
-0.00008   (0.00005) 
 0.0021**  (0.0010) 
-0.00002  (0.00004) 
 0.0044     (0.0032) 
-0.00008 (0.00009) 
 0.0009       (0.0014) 
-0.00007 (0.00005) 
Level (base: level 3) 













 0.127*** (0.023) 
 0.016        (0.018) 
 
excluded 
 0.037***   (0.012) 
-0.037*** (0.006) 




Sales, marketing, logistics, … 





 0.007       (0.010) 
-0.001       (0.001) 
-0.002       (0.009) 
 0.017       (0.015) 
 0.015       (0.012) 
-0.003       (0.011) 
 0.040**   (0.020) 
-0.002       (0.010) 
 
-0.006       (0.016) 
 0.001       (0.014) 
 0.016       (0.014) 
 0.004       (0.013) 
 0.025*     (0.014) 
-0.002       (0.013) 
-0.005       (0.013) 
 0.003        (0.014) 
 
-0.035**   (0.018) 
-0.005       (0.023) 
 0.005       (0.018) 
 0.022       (0.025) 
 0.005       (0.026) 
 0.007       (0.028) 
 0.013       (0.022) 
 0.037       (0.027) 
 
 0.012*      (0.007) 
 0.049***  (0.016) 
 
 0.094*** (0.020) 
 0.056*** (0.006) 
 0.021**   (0.009) 
-0.009       (0.023) 
 0.001       (0.009) 
Schooling (base: university) 
University of applied sciences degree 
Apprenticeship degree 
 
-0.019       (0.011) 
-0.043       (0.031) 
 
-0.018       (0.012) 
-0.055***   (0.017) 
 
-0.002       (0.018) 
-0.092*** (0.034) 
 
-0.020       (0.013) 
 0.015       (0.017) 
Field of study (base: chemistry) 




-0.003        (0.012) 
 0.001        (0.007) 
-0.008        (0.021) 
 
0.021        (0.036) 
-0.011        (0.009) 
-0.014        (0.015) 
 
 0.025        (0.019) 
 0.019        (0.017) 
 0.027        (0.030) 
 
-0.008       (0.007) 
-0.009        (0.008) 
-0.051**    (0.019) 
Sex [1=female]  -0.010        (0.014)  -0.031**     (0.015)  -0.031        (0.020)  -0,007        (0.009) 
Age  -0.001        (0.001)  -0.001         (0.001)   0.001        (0.002)   0.0019*** (0.0007) 
Intercept   0.254***  (0.032)   0.239***  (0.036)   0.039        (0.069)   0.055*      (0.030) 
Number of observations  317  178  136 112 
R
2  0.166 0.237 0.458 0.634 
Notes: The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors. Significant result at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated 
with *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
 
 